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Abstract 
 
Japan has struggled with the decision to either revise or to reinterpret the 
renunciation of war clause, Chapter 2, Article 9, in the Japanese Constitution.  
This debate is significant because the outcome of this decision will have a direct 
impact of Japan’s defense policies, its security arrangement with the United 
States, and its involvement in international politics.  In order to reach a definite 
decision, on this issue, the majority of Japanese politicians and the public will 
need to agree on one approach, which they have not been able to do.  This paper 
will analyze the historic events and policies that have shaped this debate and 
public opinion.  Essentially, this paper argues that the public opinion regarding 
whether Article 9 should be revised is a result of traditional norms and feudal 
policies, the diminished public trust in the government following WWII, and the 
public’s awareness of the policies and provisions of the Japanese Constitution.  
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President Truman stated, “[Japan’s] ultimate position in the world depends 
upon themselves…”1  To me, this statement implies that Japan’s international 
position was and is not only a result of national policy provisions but also a product 
of the Japanese people.  This perspective is illustrated by the significant impact that 
the people’s support, cooperation, and later opinion had on Japan’s ability to position 
itself as a world power or “normal nation’ equal to some Western states.  Specifically, 
there are two periods where this perspective is most observable, the end of Japan’s 
feudal period in 1868 and the period following the end of WWII and the creation of 
the Peace Constitution of 1946.  Essentially, ending feudalism and the creation of the 
Peace Constitution were pivotal events where Japan redefined itself in an effort to 
gain equality and honor among other world powers.  Although the type and degree of 
influence that the people had on government policy differed during these two periods, 
it is clear that despite the differences in how the people influenced policy decisions 
the position of Japan in the world during these two periods was dependent upon the 
Japanese people.  
During Japan’s first attempt to reposition itself as a world power the support 
and cooperation of the people was vital while the opinions of the people were 
                                                 
1 Papers of Harry S. Truman: White House Central Files, the White House, Washington, D.C. “How 
Shall We Deal with Japan after the War to Win the Peace?” Documentary History of the Truman 
Presidency: Creating a Pluralistic Democracy in Japan: The Occupation Government, 1945-1953. 
Volume 5, University Publications of America, An imprint of CIS, 1996, p. 14-17.  
2 Morton, W. Scott, and Olenik, J. Kenneth.  Japan, Its History and Culture. McGraw Hill (Fourth 
Edition) 2005, p. 147-190.  
1 
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insignificant.2  This can be attributed to the fact that Japan’s post- feudal government 
excluded popular sovereignty but sought after the approval of local leaders.  
However, the post- feudal government was wise enough to cultivate the loyalty and 
cooperation of the general population by reinforcing traditional norms and polices 
that would yield this social outcome.  As a result, at this time Japan successfully 
implemented the necessary policy which elevated Japan into a powerful international 
position equal to that of some Western states.  
 Unlike the post-feudal era, following WWII and the establishment of popular 
sovereignty under the new Peace Constitution, not only did Japan need the support 
and cooperation of the people to rebuild the nation but it also needed the approval of 
the majority of the people in order to regain a ‘normal nation’ status.  However, 
following Japan’s successful post WWII recovery its ability to regain its ‘normal 
nation’ status was blocked by the Peace Constitution’s renunciation of war clause, 
Chapter 2 Article 9, the lack of majority approval by the public to amend the article.  
Essentially, it was the social norms of policies that invoked a since of obligation and 
cooperation of the people that allowed the new post-feudal government to reach its 
national goals.  However, given the policies established dur ing the US occupation of 
Japan and the growth of a predominately pacifist public, Japan’s post WWII period 
was unable to regain a ‘normal nation’ status, which demonstrates the significant 
implications of President Truman’s statement that the position of the country is 
determined by the Japanese themselves.   
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In order to best evaluate Japan’s journey towards a ‘normal nation’ status and 
analyze the key factors that determine this position, it is necessary to also understand 
the norms and policy that is at the core of Japan’s inability to attain a ‘normal nation’ 
position following WWII.  Essentially, the Peace Constitution of 1946 brought a 
variety of new democratic provision that have impacted Japan’s political, economic 
and social system.  However, the policy that has had a direct impact on Japan’s 
position in the world is Chapter 2, Article 9- the renunciation of war clause, which 
will also be referred to as Article 9.  Article 9 hinders Japan’s national autonomy by 
prohibiting Japan from using force as a means for settling international disputes, from 
maintaining an army, navy or air force, and from participating in collective defense, 
which in turn ultimately prevents Japan from becoming a member of the United 
Nations Security Council.3  In other words, following WWII the policy provision that 
directly prevented Japan from regain its ‘normal nation’ status was Article 9.   
As a result, Article 9 has been the central focus of Japan’s debate over its 
commitments overseas and its growing national defense concerns related to the 
Korean threat and the growing power of China.  Essentially, following WWII 
reconstruction, Article 9 was a source of Japan’s soft power.  It was a tool that 
allowed Japan to focus the majority of resources on its economic recovery while the 
United States and its Allies attended to the security needs of Japan and the Far East 
region. 4  However, once Japan’s economy recovered from the war so did its 
                                                 
3 Samuels, Richard J. “Constitutional Revision in Japan: The Future of Article 9.”  The Brookings 
Institution-Center for Northeast Asian Policy Studies Roundtable Discussion (December 2004), p. 1-
20.  
4 Morton, W. Scott, and Olenik, J. Kenneth.  Japan, Its History and Culture. McGraw Hill (Fourth 
Edition) 2005, p. 147-190. 
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responsibilities for its own national defense and to international collective security 
operations.  However, despite the successful changes in Japan’s economy, social and 
political system and the renewed desire to join the UN Security Council, the wording 
of Article 9 remained unchanged.  This is the result of a split between in both the 
government and public regarding whether or not Japan ought to revise Article 9.  As a 
result, unlike the post feudalism era where modernization and public cooperation 
were the key factors to Japan’s world position, the central factor of the post-WWII 
era’s journey towards a ‘normal nation’ status is the people decision to approve or 
oppose amending Article 9.  
If a revision of Article 9 is not approved by the people, the alternative will be 
a reinterpretation of Article 9.  The reinterpretation of Article 9 would allow Japan to 
better address is national defense needs and collective security obligations without 
changing the wording of Article 9.  In turn, Article 9 would be even more irrelevant 
to the security needs and obligations of Japan.  In addition, by not amending Article 
9, it will continue to be a source of embarrassment, and an obstacle for Japanese 
membership in the UN Security Counc il.  The proposed amendments to Article 9 
would change the wording to allow for a self-defense force and Japan’s participation 
in collective defense.  However, by changing the wording of Article 9 there is a 
potential threat of generating a public and regional backlash against possible Japanese 
remilitarization.   With the leading political party in favor of revis ion, the ultimate 
decision rest in the hands of the public.  It is this reason why an analysis of the public 
opinion regarding whether Article 9 should be revised is such a relevant and timely 
topic to investigate.  According to the Japanese constitution, policy revision not only 
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requires a 2/3rd majority vote in the government but also the approval of the majority 
of the people.  In 2007, both the lower and upper house of the Diet, Japan’s 
legislature, passed a bill outlining a referendum to amend the constitution’s Article 9, 
however the public will not vote on the amendment until 2010.5  In the meantime, 
‘the government is simultaneously preparing a revised interpretation of the Article 9 
in order to make room for security cooperation with the United States and others in 
limited contexts…[where] the scope of collective defense [that] the current 
government is willing to support is of limited nature – far from making Japan a 
‘normal military power.’”6 According to a survey conducted by the Asahi Shimbun in 
May of 2007, “78% of voters said the Constitution’s war-renouncing Article 9—
which Prime Minister Shinzo Abe wants to revise – has helped to maintain peace in 
Japan.”7 “Only 18% of the respondents in the May 2007 survey said the Self-Defense 
Forces should be turned into a ‘self-defense military,’ showing a wide gap between 
public opinion and the direction of the revisions being pushed by the ruling Liberal 
Democratic Party.”8  As this survey illustrates, despite the interest of government in 
revising Article 9, there is a large percentage of the public that supports Article 9 in 
its current state and attributes Japan’s peace to this amendment.  To best analyze the 
current public’s opinion regarding the Article 9, an understanding of the core factors 
that shaped the Japanese perspective towards Japanese policy making and war is 
                                                 
5 “Japan’s ‘Group 13’ Seeks Article 9 Loopholes-Legislators seek Clarity on Permitted Use of Force.”  
(5/28/07). <http://www.defensenews.com/story.php?F=2780394&C=asiapac> (16 January 2008). 
6  “Japan’s ‘Group 13’ Seeks Article 9 Loopholes-Legislators seek Clarity on Permitted Use of Force.”  
(5/28/07). <http://www.defensenews.com/story.php?F=2780394&C=asiapac> (16 January 2008). 
7 “78% say Article 9 has helped keep Japan peace” Asahi Shimbun (May 3, 2007) < 
http://www.asahi.com/english/Herald -asahi/TKY200705030084.html. (9 October 2007).  
8 “78% say Article 9 has helped keep Japan peace” Asahi Shimbun (May 3, 2007) < 
http://www.asahi.com/english/Herald -asahi/TKY200705030084.html. (9 October 2007).  
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needed.  To accomplish this task, I will present the argument that the public opinion 
regarding a revision of Article 9 is a result of historical norms and polices, the 
diminished public trust in the government following WWII, and the public’s 
awareness of policies and provisions of the Japanese Constitution and their impact on 
Japan’s international repetition.  Furthermore, it is my position that the factor that had 
the largest impact on public opinion is the change in public awareness of policies and 
provisions specific to Article 9 and their impact on Japan’s international repetition.  
In order to best illustrate this perspective, I will present an historical survey of 
Japan’s journey towards a ‘normal nation’ status and a discussion of these three core 
factors that shaped the public’s opinion regarding the Article 9 debate. 
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Historical Overview-Feudalism and the Meiji Restoration:  
The first factor that influenced the opinions of the people is Japan’s historical 
norms and policies.  Specifically, the traditional social system and the method of how 
national policies were enforced can be shown to have had a direct impact of the 
perspective of the public and their opinion of Japan’s national status and Article 9.  
Specifically, Japan has a long history of hereditary autocracy and a lack of democratic 
rights of the people.  As a result, Japan developed a tradition where the leadership 
established and enforced national policies with little to no public involvement.  In 
fact, the public was not encouraged to express their opinions but rather only their 
support.9  This is one of the social and policy norms that have been present within 
Japan’s feudal and post feudal period as well as during the first 20 years following 
WWII which has also shaped the attitude of the public towards Japan’s position in the 
world.10  To begin analyzing the norms and policies that have shaped the public 
opinion towards the Article 9 debate I will start with a survey of Japan’s history.   
Maintaining centralized governmental control over the public and the local 
leaders was a challenge for Japan.  When Japan initially brought all of the separate 
providence under the control of one centralized government its primary challenge was 
maintaining public support and diminishing tax revenues.  In order to overcome these 
challenges, Japan used adopted the Chinese faith of Buddhism, the Chinese 
philosophy of Confucianism, and then further shaped the Shinto religion to establish 
                                                 
9 Morton, W. Scott, and Olenik, J. Kenneth.  Japan, Its History and Culture. McGraw Hill (Fourth 
Edition) 2005, p. 4-146. 
10 Morton, W. Scott, and Olenik, J. Kenneth.  Japan, Its History and Culture. McGraw Hill (Fourth 
Edition) 2005, p. 4-146 
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the right of the emperor to rule.  These three faiths shaped the class and etiquette 
structure that governed both the family and political spheres.11  An example of this is 
illustrated by the word for “religious affairs,’ matusrigoto, which is also the Japanese 
word for ‘government.’12  By intertwining faith and government, Japan was able to 
establish the authority of the ruling powers and shape the individual attitude towards 
order, obligation, and duty.  After applying a feudal system that established a 
hereditary and class structure, the government then had to address the loss of financial 
revenue that went to landlords but was needed by the government in order to maintain 
centralized governmental control.  This fiscal dilemma was addressed by keeping 
more accurate records of taxes owed, established under the Taika Reform and Taiho 
Code of 702 A.D., where the tax exemptions was now limited to estates held by 
governmental or religious institutions.   As a result of the increased governmental 
revenue generated under the Taika Reform & Taiho Code, the authority of the 
emperor was increased thus strengthening the power of the government.  With the 
new feudal social and fiscal policies in place, the feudal system was able to 
indoctrinated the social and policy norms of obligation, obedience and the policy of 
hereditary rule which are the core norms and policies that have persisted throughout 
the majority of Japan’s history and shaped the attitudes of Japanese today.   
From approximately 700-1868 AD, Japan was governed by a feudal system 
where power was hereditary.  The leaders of the system included daimyos (territorial 
                                                 
11 Morton, W. Scott, and Olenik, J. Kenneth.  Japan, Its History and Culture. McGraw Hill (Fourth 
Edition) 2005, p. 16-52. 
12 Morton, W. Scott, and Olenik, J. Kenneth.  Japan, Its History and Culture. McGraw Hill (Fourth 
Edition) 2005, p. 16-52. 
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lord), who were lesser hereditary aristocrats, sessho (regents), who were 
spokespersons and interim rulers when a emperor happened to be a child, and a 
government that was operated by appointed persons under the control of the shogun 
(Supreme Military Commander of the government ), who were hereditary aristocratic 
family that became the ruling family and official spokesperson of the emperor.  The 
shogun’s power was rooted in two historical events when the emperor’s office was 
conferred to a military deputy commander and a regent for a specific time period.  
The first situation occurred between during the Taika Reforms, where in 783-803 a 
bakufu, a “tent government” or military rule, was set up where the emperor conferred 
his office to the deputy commander Sakanouye Tamura Maro.13  During Sakanouye’s 
control, he achieved much success in enforcing the Taika Reforms he was awarded 
the title sei-i taishogun, “barbarian-subduing generalissimo.”14 For the next 10 
centuries, following the creation of the new title bestowed on Sakanouye, Sei-i 
Taishogun became a title that most military men desired. The second event occurred 
when a new emperor was still a child, 9 years of age.  Given the age of the new 
emperor, a regent, Fujiwara, gained control over the government becoming the 
spokesperson for the Emperor.  During this time Fujiwara believed that it was his and 
later his descendants’ right to rule.  He strategically presented his daughters as wives 
or concubines for the emperors making himself the father- in- law and/or grandfather 
of future emperors, which in turn secured his and his decedents position as regent.  
                                                 
13 Morton, W. Scott, and Olenik, J. Kenneth.  Japan, Its History and Culture. McGraw Hill (Fourth 
Edition) 2005, p. 37, 68-80. 
14 Morton, W. Scott, and Olenik, J. Kenneth.  Japan, Its History and Culture. McGraw Hill (Fourth 
Edition) 2005, p. 37. 
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However given Fujiwara’s belief that he and his decedents should rule the country, 
he took on the military title shogunate, establishing him and his family as the ruling 
family who spoke on behalf of the emperor.  Following the creation of shogun as the 
governmental leader and spokesperson of the emperor, the position of shogun became 
a hereditary post.  In order to secure the power of the government that the Fujiwara 
Shogun took over he used the emperor to legitimize his authority and public 
discussions became highly discouraged. 15  
 However, during the feudal era even the power of the ruling shogun was 
limited.  To the detriment of the shogun’s power, the daimyo controlled the 
production and revenue of the land that they ruled over, which limited the income of 
the state.16  An example of this multileveled ruling system was illustrated best when 
efforts by the emperor to implement land reform or tighter centralized governmental 
control were blocked by the autocrats.  The only way the emperor was able to 
successfully challenge a policy, accomplished by Emperor Shirakawa after retiring in 
1886, was to work through lesser aristocrats.17  Eventually, in the mid 1800s, this 
feudal system grew incapable of addressing the rising unemployed and peasant 
protests, the rise in the merchant class, and the influx of Western knowledge and 
                                                 
15  Rhoads Murphey.  A History of Asia, Harper. Collins College Publishers, (Second Edition) 1996, 
138. 
16 Morton, W. Scott, and Olenik, J. Kenneth.  Japan, Its History and Culture. McGraw Hill (Fourth 
Edition) 2005, p. 134-167. 
17 Rhoads Murphey.  A History of Asia.  Harper Collins College Publishers, (Second Edition) 1996, p. 
138. 
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techniques.18  Under these challenging conditions the power of the shogun was fatally 
weakened.   
In 1853, after two centuries of successfully deflecting various attempts by 
Western nations to engage Japan in trade, the Tokugawa Shogun, who’s family held 
power from 1600- 1867, was unable to defend against the American threat led by 
Commodore Matthew C. Perry. 19   Commodore Perry and his steam frigates, referred 
to as the “Black ships,”  were commanded by US President Fillmore to broker a treaty 
with Japan that would address both the needs of the distressed US mariners in the 
waters surrounding Japan along with US trade interests in the East.20   Commodore 
Perry presented a written document that outlined the American intentions and 
demands to the Tokugawa Shogun.   According to the document, Japan was given one 
year to consider opening up its ports to the Americans.  Tokugawa was also told in 
the document that Commodore Perry’s return, in 1854, will be accompanied by a 
larger show of force.   
The Tokugawa Shogun consulted with some daimyo (local leaders) and the 
emperor’s court regarding the treaty proposal.  The majority of these advisors were 
                                                 
18 Morton, W. Scott, and Olenik, J. Kenneth.  Japan, Its History and Culture. McGraw Hill (Fourth 
Edition) 2005, p. 137. 
19 Historically – “Japan decided neither to admit foreigners to free and open trading nor to continue the 
overseas trade ventures to Southeast Asia which Japan itself had undertaken with considerable success 
in the sixteenth century.  By this decision for retreat and isolation Japan gained stability and internal 
solidarity at a time when these factors were urgently needed in its society.  But there was a certain 
irony in the fact that this closing down and sealing off took place just when the rest of the world was 
being opened up to an interchange of goods and ideas.” Morton, W. Scott, and Olenik, J. Kenneth.  
Japan, Its History and Culture. McGraw Hill (Fourth Edition) 2005, p. 123. 
20 Morton, W. Scott, and Olenik, J. Kenneth.  Japan, Its History and Culture. McGraw Hill (Fourth 
Edition) 2005, p. 137. 
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against the unfair trade treaty proposal presented by United States.21  However, given 
the show of force that accompanied Perry’s 1854 return, the Tokugawa Shogun was 
unable to honor the daimyo’ s opinions; he was forced by the overwhelming 
American threat of force to concede to the treaty terms of the United States.22  As a 
result, the Treaty of Kanagawa was created, also referred to as the “unfair trade 
treaty.”   
This event was an eye-opener for both the Japanese people and aristocratic 
powers.  The country opposed the inferior trade position that Japan was forced into by 
the Tokugawa Shogunate.  And they also gained an awareness of their military and 
technological inferiority relative to the West.  Given the growing public unrest and 
embarrassment, this situation made Japan susceptible to a revolution.  However, 
given Japan’s unique social system, unlike most revolutions, the peasants or general 
population were not the ones who actively participated in the revolution.  Instead, the 
1868 revolt, called the Meiji Restoration, was led by modest rank samurai with the 
support of a few prominent daimyo, and experienced very little opposition and was 
considered a bloodless revolution.23   The lack of public opposition can be attributed 
to the traditional structure where the social hierarchal system that discouraged the 
public from questioning and discussing national policies implemented by the higher 
                                                 
21  Morton, W. Scott, and Olenik, J. Kenneth.  Japan, Its History and Culture. McGraw Hill (Fourth 
Edition) 2005, p. p.134-146. 
22 Morton, W. Scott, and Olenik, J. Kenneth.  Japan, Its History and Culture. McGraw Hill (Fourth 
Edition) 2005, p. 134-167. 
23 Morton, W. Scott, and Olenik, J. Kenneth.  Japan, Its History and Culture. McGraw Hill (Fourth 
Edition) 2005, p. 134-167. 
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ranked government.24     Under the Meiji Restoration, the power of Emperor Meiji 
was restored, the Tokugawa Shogun was removed from power, the capital was moved 
to Edo – present day Tokyo, and the new leaders sought to eliminate all feudal 
institutions and embraced western technology and knowledge in order to improve 
their economic and military status.  For the Meiji Restoration leaders their objective 
was to modernize Japan in order to gain equality with Western powers.  In order to 
accomplish this goal they needed the cooperation public and the support of the local 
leaders and the public.  This was why it was important for the emperor to be restored 
to power.  Using the emperor as a tool to rally the public, the Meiji Restoration 
leaders knew that the beliefs and traditions associated with the divinity of the emperor 
would translate into public obedience and cooperation during the transition of 
governments.  
During Meiji Restoration, Japan grafted their traditional imperial system with 
the British parliamentary system.  Policies that were implemented had the appearance 
of the beginning stages of democracy; however, similar to the former Japanese feudal 
system the public opinion did not directly influence national policy.  In fact, because 
many of the fractional party leaders were made up of former daimyo and/or samurai 
the traditional method of implementing policies without public discussion remained a 
norm within the new government.   However, the Meiji Restoration leaders took steps 
to ensure that the challenges that the daimyo and samurai posed to the feudal system 
did not undermine the success of the new government.  As a result, “in 1887 the 
                                                 
24 Morton, W. Scott, and Olenik, J. Kenneth.  Japan, Its History and Culture. McGraw Hill (Fourth 
Edition) 2005, p. 16-51; 134-167. 
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Emperor announced, on behalf of the government, the abolition of all domains.”25  
Although this news was shocking to the daimyo and pubic there was no major 
opposition to the change.  According to Morton and Olenik in the book, Japan its 
History and Culture, one reason for the lack of opposition to the Meiji reforms was 
both the historical tradition of loyalty to the government as well as the presence of 
Westerners throughout Japan. 26 At this time, the Meiji era looked again for public 
support not public opinion.  For example, the new system did not create new 
democratic liberties for the general public but the government wanted to give the 
former daimyo the feeling of being a part of creating national polices.  As a result, the 
Meiji Restorations Chapter Oath, Article 1 stated, “Deliberative assemblies shall be 
widely established and all matters decided by public discussion.”27  
Ultimately, the Meiji restoration sought to “strengthen and modernize” and 
“win equality with other nations.”28  The strategy for reaching these goals involved 
both modernizing the military and institutional structures along with governmental 
reform. The method used to accomplish these goals included borrowing knowledge 
from abroad and adapting the new knowledge to the Japanese culture.  For example, 
under the Meiji restoration, Japan established a parliamentary system that was 
governed by an Imperial Constitution, a strong navy and army modeled after Western 
                                                 
25 Morton, W. Scott, and Olenik, J. Kenneth.  Japan, Its History and Culture. McGraw Hill (Fourth 
Edition) 2005, p. 150. 
26 Morton, W. Scott, and Olenik, J. Kenneth.  Japan, Its History and Culture.  McGraw Hill (Fourth 
Edition) 2005, p. 147-167. 
27 Morton, W. Scott, and Olenik, J. Kenneth.  Japan, Its History and Culture.   McGraw Hill (Fourth 
Edition) 2005, p. 147-167. 
28 Rhoads Murphey.  A History of Asia, Harper. Collins College Publishers (Second Edition) 1996, p. 
299. 
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military forces, and formally sanctioned Westernization of Japan under the slogan 
“Eastern ethics and Western science.”29  This approach not only rapidly modernized 
Japan but it also proved that Japan was a “civilized” and powerful country. 30  
However, it must be noted that Japan was able to successfully implement these 
changes because the Japanese population believed in putting the good of the nation 
above the interests of the individua l.  In other words, it was the patriotism of the 
Japanese people and Western technology that led to Japan’s rapid rise to power.31   
Following the Meiji era (1868-1912) Japan became a world power.32  In 1899, 
Britain relinquished the unequal clauses in its treaty with Japan and “other nations 
soon followed suit.”33  Given Japan’s new powerful position within the world 
community, Japan began to also imitate the Western imperialistic behavior.  At this 
time Japan was the recipient of Western support. In fact, Japan’s decision to go to war 
with Russia was “supported by the Anglo-Japanese Treaty of Alliance and Friendship 
signed in 1902.  Unlike the initial unequal trade treaty with the United States, this 
new US-Japan arrangement was welcomed in Japan because it served as a symbol to 
Japan that they had reached international equality with Western powers.” 34  From 
1902 until the most influential time of Japanese militarism at the onset of WWII, 
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Japan’s position in the world was ‘normal’ – equal to that of some western states.   
This position included (1) being an economic and military world power equal with 
other imperial powers within the international community, (2) being in good relations 
with the US, and (3) being in an unthreatening position to Western interests in the Far 
East.35  
Despite the strategic importance of the Anglo-Japan Treaty of Alliance and 
Friendship, the economic relationship between Japan and the United States remained 
insignificant at that time, limited to only US export of oil and kerosene.36  Essentially, 
the alliance was aimed at long-term goals.  It served to ensure future access to the Far 
East Asian region for the West and as a political tool for trade equality and a deterrent 
against foreign threats for Japan.  As the Japanese saw it, “in their determination to 
remain free, the Japanese government adopted one of two extreme positions.  They 
either retired within themselves in the attempt to deal with a hostile world by 
excluding it, or they wholeheartedly accepted the comity of nations and tried to 
integrate themselves fully within it in the hope that cooperation would ensure their 
independence.”37  The government was able to successfully accomplish the latter 
option by promoting “spiritual mobilization,” where the people were united under the 
Shinto faith of emperor worship, and a sense of purpose and social obligation to the 
emperor and state.  Essentially, Japan’s social and political system has a history of 
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being governed by a system of hierarchy, duty and obligations, called giri.   For 
example, the Confucian ethics of the samurai, loyalty to one’s lord took precedence 
over all other considerations, even over the family loyalty and filial piety which was 
such a feature of the Confucianism of China was absorbed into Japanese society. 38  
This was the first key factor that shaped the attitude of the Japanese people towards 
policy making and change.  Essentially, the people trusted the government to act 
benevolently towards them in exchange for their unconditional trust, sacrifice, and 
obedience for the good of the nation.   
Rise of Militarism & WWII 
In addition to the traditional norms and policies that has shaped the public 
opinion of amending Article 9, the second key factor that has had a major impact on 
the Japanese was their loss of trust in the Japanese government.  This occurred when 
Japan sacrificed its benevolent policy in exchange for the opportunity to build a 
Japanese Empire.  The time period that this occurred in was between WWI and the 
end of WWII.  Prior to WWI, Japan enjoyed a short period of economic success and 
even joined the Allies in WWI as an equal partner.  At that time, Japan did not fight 
in Europe along with the other Allies, but they did provide a few naval destroyers to 
assist the British Mediterranean fleet.39   For Japan the focus during this time was 
gaining power in the East.  As a result, at the end of WWI, Japan seized the 
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opportunity to “take over the German concession areas in China, centered in the 
province of Shantung in eastern north China.   
In 1915 Japan presented a list of Twenty-One Demands which included the 
stationing of troops and of Japanese “advisers” to the Chinese government that would 
have made China in effect a Japanese colony.”40   This act infuriated the Chinese and 
fueled the Japanese imperialist ideas.   However, the economic success of the Meiji 
Restoration quickly reversed course when the Great Depression became a worldwide 
phenomenon that even Japan was not immune to.   
“[Japan’s] exports declined by 50 percent in the two years following 1929.  
The greatest suffering was felt by the farmers and peasants, when the silk cocoon 
prices dropping 65 percent in one year, in 1929-1930.  The real incomes of industrial 
workers suffered as it went from an index of 100 in 1926 to 69 in 1931; but the 
corresponding figures for rural incomes went from 100 to 33.  As a result, peasants 
were forced to eat the bark of trees and sold their daughters to city brothels.41  In the 
turn, the people directed their anger against the zaibatsu, the “large business 
interests;” identified with the landlords in the popular mind.”42   However, unlike 
both the public and the civilian politicians, the military officers directed the blame on 
Japan’s dependent position within the international community and the imperialist 
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foreign policies of Britain and America that shaped the economic system.43  Given the 
turmoil of the Great Depression, the military politicians used their higher rank over 
civilian politicians to implement a new order that favored their perspective.  As a 
result, the government, which at this time was seeing more military influence on 
decision making , made a dramatic change to overcome the effects of their 
dependence on the system; they took Japan off the gold standard.  Quickly “Japan’s 
exports rose sharply, and Japan began to recover more quickly than any other 
industrial country; but an irreversible trend towards militarism had already set in.”44   
  Many military officers – whose positions were viewed as more superior to 
the civilian government, were originally from rural farms that were hit hardest by the 
depression.  Given the pervasive impact of the depression on Japan, a number of 
military officers believed that the ethics and ideas of the military would better shape 
Japan’s foreign and domestic policies to protect Japan from international instabilities 
such as the depression. 45  As a result, the military assumed more decision making 
authority within the government.  In fact, given the traditional norms and social 
hierarchy system in Japan, the military felt entitled to act on behalf of the emperor in 
order to protect Japan.  For example, despite the growing opposition to militarism by 
the pro-democracy fractions, the military made it difficult for anyone to oppose their 
choices for the highest post by invoking the name of the emperor.  If this method was 
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unsuccessful, then they would use other strategies to interfere with the agenda of 
oppositional fractions.  For instance, “if a civilian premier was unacceptable to the 
dominant forces in the army, the nomination of an officer to the post of army minister 
was delayed and thus the formation of the cabinet could be hung up indefinitely…as a 
result, the Diet was becoming less and less effective.”46  In the end, under the 
authority of General Toji the country came under the control of a “coalition of 
military and compliant civilian officials.”47    
 When Japanese militarism was at its peak, in the 1930s, Japan began to ally 
itself with Germany and started to separate itself from the Allied forces and initiated 
more grand imperialist ventures.48  In 1931, Japan occupied Korea and set up a 
puppet state, Manchuria.  On March 27, 1933, Japan formally withdrew from the 
League of Nations, and systematically abrogated the numerous international 
agreements it signed at the Washington Conference in the previous decade.49  This 
was a result of the militarist belief that Japan’s survival depended on the creation of 
hegemony in Asian where the perceived external enemy was the “decadent 
democracies.”50  As a result, Japanese imperialism grew stronger with the new order 
goal of becoming the dominate power in the East.   Essentially, a co-prosperity sphere 
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would be created where Germany would be the dominate power in the West and 
Japan would be the dominate power in the East.   
In order to implement this objective, civil opposition to the new order was 
highly discouraged.  The government declared that the “liberal democracy was 
outmoded in the rapidly changing world of the 1930s, and it was argued that “Japan 
ought to impose fascism ‘from above.’51  In order to prepare the public for the 
governmental and economic changes that Japan was undergoing, a booklet was 
published which outlined a two-tear program: to develop Japan’s colonies as a 
“resource base,” a mission that Ishiwara and the Kwantung Army took up in 1931, 
and to centralize government control over the domestic economy to ensure that the 
army was capable of respond ing immediately and effectively should they go to war.52  
In addition, the government “campaigned to cleanse the nation of ‘dangerous 
thoughts.”  The government indicted, executed and/or assassinated liberals who 
opposed the new order and denounced the changes as being ‘totalitarian politics’ in 
the late 1930s.  The government also issued new textbooks to schoolchildren in order 
to “develop a new Japan by virtue of the Way of the Empire which stands firm 
throughout the ages at home and abroad, and thereby more than ever to guard and 
maintain the prosperity of the Imperial Throne which is coeval with heaven and 
earth.”53   The process of “spiritual mobilization” was an easy initiative for the 
military to carry through because Japan had a traditional norm and policies that 
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conditioned the people to be “disciplined and dedicated to the service of the emperor 
and the country.”54  
With the mandatory cooperation and obedience of the people and the civilian 
politicians in place, by 1936, the military had a stronger hold within the Japanese 
government.  As a result, “The emperor’s was positioned as head of the armed 
services, and the General Staff was placed directly responsible to the emperor as well 
as having a place in the cabinet which was chaired by the premier.  The service 
ministers’ direct responsibility to the emperor and their right of access to him gave 
them a measure of control over the cabinet and the civilian ministers… In 1936 the 
rule that the service ministers had to be serving officers on the active list was revived.  
This in turn placed these ministers under the control of army and navy opinion, and 
made it impossible in effect for anyone to hold those officers who did not enjoy the 
confidence of the main body of the officers.”55  By 1937, Japan set its imperialist 
goals on China with the objective to later go after Southeast Asia, Australia, and 
India.56  Japan began a step by step encroachment into northern China by first 
attempting maneuvers in the Beijing area.  However, China lunched a defensive battle 
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against the imperialist Japanese at Marco Polo Bridge.57   This marked the beginning 
of Japan’s entry into WWII.   
By September 1940, Japan signed a tripartite pact with Germany and Italy.  
And, “in April 1941, the Japanese negotiated a pact of neutrality with the Soviet 
Union.”58  Japan then turned its attention towards to the United States, its former 
strategic ally.  After the U.S. oil embargo crippled the Japanese, in 1941, Japan 
attacked Pearl Harbor.59  When Japan’s resources ran low, the Japanese military then 
turned to the Japanese people, whose patriotism and faith were the foundation of the 
success of the Meiji restoration, to sacrifice their lives as war resources.  Young men 
were trained as Kamikaze pilots (“wind of the gods”).  The Kamikaze pilots “flew 
planes to destruction, aiming their bomb or torpedo loads directly at the target and 
perishing in the explosion.”60    In the end, Japan not only lost the war, in 1945, but 
also experienced the loss of lives by the hand of the ir own government and 
foreigners.  As a result, the patriotism and faith of the people that once propelled 
Japan into a position of international power comparable to other world powers, now 
turned against the militaristic government.61  In fact, following the war the people 
blamed the military led government for destroying the national honor and 
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accomplishments made under the Meiji Restoration policies.62  This loss of trust was 
the second key factor that shaped the attitude of the Japanese people and is one of the 
key arguments why the people have failed to support any policies that could result in 
a possible remilitarized government.   
 
Figure 1: Representatives of Japan stand aboard the USS Missouri 
prior to signing of the Instrument of Surrender.63 
 
Occupation and Peace Constitution  
The third factor that has contributed greatly to the shaping of the Japanese 
public’s attitude towards Article 9 is the public’s awareness of constitutional policies 
and provisions and their impact on Japan’s international repetition.  Traditionally, 
Japan created and enforced policies from the top down.  The public involvement in 
policy decision making was minimum at best.  Immediately following the end of 
WWII this lack of public invo lvement did not change.   In fact, the majority of the 
immediate post-WWII changes were fashioned by the US led occupation and was a 
reflection of the US foreign policy in the Far East.  Once a policy was established it 
then became the responsibility of the Japanese government to implement and enforce 
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the new policy.  As a result, the public was not involved in the designing of the new 
governmental system, national or foreign policy.   
The reason why the democratic occupiers choose to manage the occupationa l 
reforms in the manner was due the US perspective of the threat that the Japanese still 
posed to the Allies.  Specifically, the US Office of War Information stated that Japan 
would be dangerous to the US if the US victory was not complete because, (1) “her 
ruling group is committed to a long range policy of ruthless expansion; (2) her 
regimented society and her national cult of Emperor-worship give these rulers total 
control of the Japanese people whom they can use as instruments for their imperialist 
adventures; (3) Japan is a highly industrialized country, whose productive capacity, 
natural resources, population, etc., provide her rulers with the material power to make 
war.”64   From 1945-1952, for the first time in Japanese history, Japan was occupied 
by foreigner powers.  The Allied occupation of Japan was managed by the Truman 
Administration and General Douglas McArthur, the Supreme Commander of Allied 
Powers (SCAP). 65   The objective of this occupation was to reshape Japan in the 
image of the democratic West in order to prevent Japan from becoming a potential 
future threat to US interests and to use Japan to advance US interests in the Far 
Eastern region. In order to implement the occupation reforms, the US and SCAP had 
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to rely on the history of Japan to shape its future.  The key factor that contributed 
most significant impact on the success of the occupation was the use of the Japanese 
tradition of top down state management and the emperor worship.  However, by using 
the traditional approaches to managing the State that was endemic of Japan, the 
public was excluded from the state building processes and thus unaware of the 
decisions being made until well after a national policy was established.   As a result, 
although it was believed that Japan’s ultimate position was dependent upon 
“themselves” the people were not allowed to participate in the post-WWII 
positioning.   
  Figure 2: Douglas MacArthur and Emperor Hirohito.66 
Essentially, the post-WWII recovery was based on the US’s foreign policy 
towards Japan.  Specifically, according to the Truman Administration, for the greatest 
good and security of us all… the ten recommended measures [towards Japan] are: 67* 
1. “Complete and total military defeat until every last person in Japan’s 
armed forces and every civilian at home knows it from personal 
experience.  
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2. Removal from Japan’s control of all territories she has seized-
Formosa, Korea, Manchuria, the Mandated Islands.  Without them she 
could not have become strong enough to wage the present war.  
Without them she cannot start another. 
3. Occupation and control by a joint United Nations force.  It must be 
brought home to the Japanese once and for all that they are being 
defeated, disarmed and occupied, not because of any one nation’s 
designs on them, but because by their own lawlessness they have 
outraged world opinion. That occupation should be terminated as soon 
as possible, but her isolation continue until her own people clean house 
and set up a government that demonstrates it will cooperate loyally 
with the other nations of the world. 
4. Japan must be totally disarmed: -her Navy, Air-force, artillery and 
tanks surrendered; her arsenals, naval bases, ship yards and military 
installations dismantled or destroyed.  Her disarmament must be 
rigidly supervised fo r at least two generations.  
5. To insure further against Japan’s rearming we should limit her imports 
of certain critical minerals.  Japan has entirely inadequate amounts of 
iron ore, coking coal, and the various alloys, which are indispensable 
in the manufacture of modern armaments. Withholding the raw 
materials of steel beyond the amounts required for the approximately 2 
million tons needed in her peacetime industry, would make it 
absolutely impossible for Japan to rearm. 
6. We must also try to disarm Japan psychologically, -- a much more 
difficult task. There is no way the common people of Japan can escape 
suffering for the errors and crimes of the government they chose or 
tolerated.  But just to defeat and disarm them and do nothing to 
develop different leadership and attitudes is not a solution [to] the 
problem, -- for them or for us.  It is utterly unrealistic to imagine that 
we can keep 75 million people permanently discontented, sullen and 
rebellious without our whole Pacific relations being constantly 
poisoned from the festering sore…the only alternative is to try to get 
them to see that their future lies in emerging from medieval feudalism 
and modernizing their thinking and social system as they have learned 
to modernize their machinery.  There is [a] real advantage to the 
United Nations in allowing the Japanese to preserve as much as they 
wish of those institutions in Japan which are uniting and steadying and 
hope-giving to them and are not vicious or trouble-making or hostile to 
other nations.  It would seem to me very unwise for us to demand, for 
example, that the Japanese overthrow their emperor worship system.  
You can destroy a man’s machine gun by force, but you cannot 
destroy by compulsion an idea in his mind or a loyalty in his heart.  It 
is certain that, after defeat the disillusioned Japanese intellectuals, the 
embittered workers and peasants will be in despair-and probably in 
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revolution.  It will be most advantageous for all concerned if we can 
guide that revolution so that it is against the real cause of Japan’s 
trouble, medieval militaristic feudalism.  I do not believe the Japanese 
will revolt against their Imperial House, or that we should try by 
derogatory insults to turn them against the throne which has been the 
center of their national life for 26 centuries, and which can be most 
valuable to us as a unifying and steadying focus of loyalty during the 
period when they are being forced by crushing defeat to reconstruct 
their whole national thinking.  When it is driven home relentlessly to 
the Japanese people that it is their own military which has betrayed 
their Emperor, has brought him not respect and prestige and honor as it 
promised, but instead disrespect, dishonor and disaster, I believe they 
can be brought to throw out not the Imperial House, but [rather] the 
military clique and its [belief that they have the right and privilege] of 
being sole interpreter of what is the true way to serve the throne.  
7. While withholding war materials so that there is no possibility of 
Japan’s rearming, we should permit her to recover economically, by 
giving her access to food supplies, to material necessary for production 
of consumer goods and rebuilding of light industries, to markets where 
she can sell the things she produces in order to pay for the things she 
needs to buy.  
8. We should take every proper means to develop China as the great 
stabilizing Bulwark in Asia.  Japan can never seriously threaten us as 
long as in her rear is a strong, independent China, friendly to the 
democracies. 
9. We should at once resume cultural and educational and missionary 
activities in Japan.  A wise observer at the turn of the century warned 
that Japan was then in the valley of decision, and that if we did not 
send 10 thousand Christian missionaries quickly, we would eventually 
have to send 100 thousand bayonets.  Well, we are having to send the 
bayonets.  I believe our very best hope of helping the Japanese develop 
a willingness to play with the world team instead of against it is 
through the thousands of Japanese Christians who have not bowed 
their hearts to militarism, nor broken their ties with fellow-Christians 
around the world.  
10. The United Nations must succeed in [creating] some system of 
organized security for the world.  Let the Japanese realize that they are 
being excluded from the family of nations, not because of their race or 
their nationality, but because of their country’s behavior.  They cannot 
change their race.  They can change their behavior.  And they, like 
other people, will if there is adequate incentive. That incentive can 
come only from assurance that their ultimate position in the world 
depends upon themselves, that there is an honorable place for them 
when they prove themselves honorable, that there is more for them to 
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gain in the long run by joining the world than by trying to conquer 
it.”68*  
Essentially, the United States learned that in order to most effectively 
implement their occupational reforms they must intertwine democracy with 
traditional Japanese norms and its political system in order to manage the county and 
implement psychological reform.   As a result, a document was created to govern the 
occupation called “Initial Post-Surrender Policies for Japan,” which was the decision 
“to work through the Japanese government and not to replace it [or the Emperor].”69  
Using the historic examples set by the former shogun(s) and the Meiji Restoration 
leaders, the United States used the emperor as a tool to gain public support and 
cooperation for the occupation’s reform efforts which they implemented using the 
traditional top down strategy.  To the United States’ surprise, although there was 
some political opposition to the occupation, the Japanese population exhibited a 
unique tolerance towards the occupation.  As Morton and Olenik stated in Japan, Its 
History and Culture, “the mood and reaction of the Japanese people toward the 
occupation went through the phases of fear, relief, gratitude, boredom, and finally a 
predictable but tolerably mild resentment.”70   
This unique tolerance was attributed to the assumption that the Japanese 
people did not blame Japan’s “defeat and occupation…on the American forces but 
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rather the Japanese military leaders who dragged Japan into the war.”71  Therefore, it 
was both Japan’s aggressive military activities that lead up to their involvement and 
defeat in WWII and the use of the A-bomb by the United States that resulted in the 
Japanese people’s complete revulsion against war and the use of force.72  In fact, 
many of the people were not in favor of allowing former government officials tried as 
war criminals to return to power as permitted by the Charter Oath, Article 1.  In the 
end, militarism in Japan not only led to the losing of the war but also the loss of 
public confidence.  
Given the public mistrust of the former Japanese government, one would 
assume that the implementation of democracy would have empowered the people to 
actively participate in policy making decisions.  However, this did not happen 
immediately.   It is my opinion that the long history of discouraging public discussion 
limited the flow of information to the masses.  However, despite the obstacles to 
gaining a better awareness of the policies and provisions being established during the 
occupation of Japan, there were some, primarily the educated, whose learning curve 
was much shorter.  This can be viewed by the correlation between time and the 
changes in public opinion trends. (See Appendix II on page 71.)  For example, in the 
1950s and 1960s, “the number of [Japanese people who] felt that the politics should 
not be left entirely in the hands of politicians, however able they might be, but should 
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also be actively discussed by the people, began to increase.73  As the national survey 
below demonstrates, with time the values of democracy and popular sovereignty 
slowly reshaped the traditional culture of leaving everything in the hands of the 
politicians. (See also Appendix IV on page 75).  However, as the table also 
demonstrates, it actually took 18 years before there was a large drop in the percentage 
of the public that supported the traditional top down governmental decision making 
process.   
Figure 3: Survey of public attitude toward national policy decisions.74 
 
 In addition, the national surveys also illustrate that not only was there a slow 
movement away from the culture of discouraging public debate but that the Japanese 
also had a difficult transition away from the ir traditional culture of emperor worship.  
Specifically, the national survey in the table below shows that during the initial 20 
years after the US occupation of Japan a majority of the public still believed in the 
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benevolence of the government and felt that the government policies were reflective 
of the public opinion. (See also Appendix VI).  
Figure 4: Survey of public attitude toward national policy decisions - Continued.75 
 
 
For this reason, the US was correct in its belief that Japan’s traditional values 
would make it possible to reshape the psychology of the people.   However, these 
were not the only two factors that contributed to the public attitude towards amending 
Article 9.  In addition, to the traditional norms and policies of Japan, and the mistrust 
of the government, there was a learning curve that required time for the public to 
adapt to the new democratic policies and procedures and to understand the impact of 
those policies on Japan’s repetition abroad.   
In essence, like any major transformation there are learning curves that exist 
that contributed to the opinion trend of the Japanese.  For the Japanese, not only did 
they require time to adapt to rapid political and economic reforms but they also 
needed time to transition from an inward looking culture to a culture that sees 
                                                 
75 Kojima, Kazuto. “Public Opinion Trends in Japan.” The Public Opinion Quarterly, Vol. 41, No.2. 
(Summer, 1977), pp. 206-216. 
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themselves as a member of the global community.  As the previous sections of this 
paper demonstrated, a large part of Japan’s history was spent adapting foreign ideas 
to suit their specific needs and not the other way around.  The Meiji Restoration 
understood the need to move away from this one directional perspective and 
attempted to embrace a position with the world as a member of the international 
community.  However, this objective was stopped short during the rise of militarism 
in Japan.  Following the occupation this task was the third factor that significantly 
impacted the perspective of the public especially with regards to policies and 
provisions specific to Article 9 and their impact on Japan’s international repetition. 
For example, the national survey that obtained public opinion of the security 
arrangement between Japan and the US, located in Appendix II, demonstrated the 
progressive learning trend over time by also tracking the number of “don’t know” 
responses from respondents.  For example, as Appendix II shows, between 1966 and 
1968 the respondents’ responses of “don’t know” dropped from 56% to 42%.  For 
this reason, it is my contention that the final key factor that has shaped the attitude of 
the public toward whether or not Article 9 should be revised is the public’s awareness 
of policies and provisions specific to Japan’s security and their impact on Japan.  
Specifically, as the culture of public discussion evolved and the people grew more 
aware of the impact that Japan’s national and security policies had on other countries 
and their own reputation the public opinion of Article 9 began to change.  To best 
demonstrate this last argument it is necessary to have an understanding of the Peace 
Constitution, the security arrangement, and current debates regarding Article 9.  
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Peace Constitution:    
In the beginning of the Allied occupation of Japan, General Douglas 
McArthur (SCAP) and the General Headquarters of the Allied Powers (GHQ) created 
two special committees within the Japanese Diet to amend the 1889 Meiji 
Constitution to better suit the spirit of the occupation’s goals outlined by the Truman 
Administration.76  However, one committee was not able to produce any drafts, and 
the draft that the second committee produced was rejected by the GHQ and SCAP 
because it did not successfully contain the factors needed to implement a democratic 
system. 77  On February 4, 1946, SCAP brought together a group of 24 American 
lawyers, headed up by Charles Louis Kades, to draft a sample constitution for Japan, 
modeled after the American Constitution. 78 Five days later*, the draft was completed 
and given to the Japanese for review.  After making only minor changes to the 
American draft a new Japanese Constitution was adopted, also referred to as the 
Peace Constitution.79  The establishment of the new Japanese constitution was 
followed by endless attempts to attribute the authorship to the Japanese by both 
Americans and the Prime Minister of Japan.  However currently, this matter is no 
                                                 
76 “Japanese Constitution.” (November 10, 2001) <www.everything2.com/index.pl?node_id=124 > (24 
February 2006). 
77 Kress, Claus. “Renunciation of War as a Universal Principle of Mankind-A Look at the Gulf War 
and the Japanese Constitution.” International and comparative Law Quarterly [Vol. 44], p. 429. 
78 “Japanese Constitution.” (November 10, 2001) <www.everything2.com/index.pl?node_id=124 > (24 
February 2006).  *Some sources state that the creation of the American draft took 7 days. Wikipedia, 
“Article 9 of the Japanese Constitution.” 
<http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Article_9_of_the_Constitution_of_Japan> (29 October 2007). 
79 “Japanese Constitution.” (November 10, 2001) <www.everything2.com/index.pl?node_id=124 > (24 
February 2006). 
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longer of importance but is rather an issue used to justify debates surrounding 
constitutional revision. 80  
The final draft was approved on November 3, 1946, one year and three 
months after the Allied forces occupied Japan.  Initially the “spirit of peace” was 
incorporated in the Preamble to the Japanese Constitution.  But in the final draft the 
“spirit of peace” became the “renunciation of war” clauses outlined in Chapter 2, 
Article 9, also referred to as Article 9.81  Article 9 aimed to abolish war as a sovereign 
right.   Specifically, Article 9 states:  
“Aspiring sincerely to an international peace based on justice and 
order, the Japanese people forever renounce war as a sovereign right of the 
nation and the threat or use of force as means of settling international 
disputes.   
In order to accomplish the aim of the preceding paragraph, land, sea, 
and air forces, as well as other war potential, will never be maintained.  The 
right of belligerency of the state will not be recognized.” 
As the wording implies, under this article Japan lost its right to use the threat 
of war or the act of an invasive war to settle disputes in addition to the rights to bear 
                                                 
80  Robert E. Ward, “The Constitution and Current Japanese Politics,”  Far Eastern Survey, American 
Institute of Pacific Relations, April 1956, vol. XXV, No. 4, pg. 49.  
81 “Also called the Ashida amendment.  Mr. Ashida was a member of the House of Representative and 
later became Prime minister. 
36 
 
arms.  However, the article intentionally did not address the defense rights of Japan.82 
The strategic ambiguousness of this section was to allow for a broad degree of 
interpretation.  However, this also led to bitter debates which have continued into the 
21st century concerning Japan’s national defense rights and Article 9.  Despite these 
debates, there were only two efforts to revise Article 9.   
The first case was the Sunakawa case of 1959.  This case addressed whether 
the US military forces based in Japan violated the prohibition of “war potential” in 
Article 9.83  The Tokyo District Court held that the accused, US military forces based 
in Japan, were in violation of the Article 9 prohibition; and that Japan did not have 
the right to arm itself with war potential even for self-defense under Article 9.84   
 “The Supreme Court overruled the judgment of the district court.  It stated 
that Article 9 was a product of the Postdam Declaration and was a reflection of the 
errors of the [Japan] prior to militaristic activities.  It held that Article 9 reflected the 
spirit of international co-operation and was ‘an embodiment of the concept of 
                                                 
82 “Article 96, paragraph 1 states: ‘Amendments to the Constitution shall be initiated by the Diet, 
through a concurring vote of two-thirds or more of all the members of each House and shall thereupon 
be submitted to the people for ratification, which shall require the affirmative vote of the majority of 
all votes cast thereupon, at a special referendum or at such election as the Diet shall specify.’  Article 
61 provides: ‘The second paragraph of the preceding article applies also to the Diet approval required 
for the conclusion of treaties’ and Article 60, paragraph 2 that: ‘Upon consideration of the budget, 
when the House of Councillors makes a decision different from that of the House of Representatives, 
and when no agreement can be reached even through a joint committee of both Houses, provided for 
by law, or in the case of failure by the House of Councillors to take final action within thirty days, the 
period of recess excluded, after the receipt of the budget passed by the House of Representatives, the 
decision of the House of Representatives shall be the decision of the Diet.’ Article 56, paragraph 2 
that: ‘All matters shall be decided, in each House, by a majority of those present…’” Kress, Claus. 
“Renunciation of War as a Universal Principle of Mankind-A Look at the Gulf War and the Japanese 
Constitution.” International and comparative Law Quarterly [Vol. 44], p. 438. 
83 Kress, Claus. “Renunciation of War as a Universal Principle of Mankind-A Look at the Gulf War 
and the Japanese Constitution.” International and comparative Law Quarterly [Vol. 44], p. 434-436. 
84 Kress, Claus. “Renunciation of War as a Universal Principle of Mankind-A Look at the Gulf War 
and the Japanese Constitution.” International and comparative Law Quarterly [Vol. 44], p. 434-436. 
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pacifism which characterized the Japanese Constitution.’ …the Supreme Court found 
nothing in the Article that denied Japan the inherent right of self-defense.  It further 
stated that the pacifism advocated in the Japanese Constitution was not intended to 
render Japan defenseless or incapable of resistance, as a nation, in the exercise of its 
inherent powers, had the right to maintain whatever measures it deemed necessary for 
self-defense.  Its resources were not limited to such military security measures as may 
be undertaken by an organ of the United Nations, and it was entitled to choose 
whatever method or means it deemed appropriate to accomplish its objectives in the 
light of the international situation.  As such, the Supreme Court held that Article 9 did 
not prohibit Japan from seeking a guarantee of security from another country, in this 
case the United States.”85   
As a result, although Article 9 states it prohibits the establishment of armed 
forces, because states have the inherent right of self-defense, Article 9 does not 
prohibit a defensive force or the use of a security arrangement for the purpose of 
defense.  In the end, the creation of the Self Defense Force, and the Treaty of Mutual 
Cooperation and Security, which will be discussed further in the next section, was not 
in violation of the Article 9 prohibitions.  
The second case was the Naganuma case, first presented on September 7, 
1973, which challenged the constitutionality of creating a Self-Defense Force, in 
1954, and the use of a judicial review-a procedure established under Article 81 of the 
                                                 
85 Kress, Claus. “Renunciation of War as a Universal Principle of Mankind-A Look at the Gulf War 
and the Japanese Constitution.” International and comparative Law Quarterly [Vol. 44], p. 434-436. 
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Peace Constitution.86 Essentially, because the constitution was translated from 
English into Japanese, “they were able to leave gaps in the language which 
subsequently politicians have been able to reinterpret, and so instead of constitution 
revision per se, what you have is revision through reinterpretation.”87  In its entirety, 
the constitution contains 103 articles or clauses.  As the Naganuma case highlighted, 
because revision through reinterpretation was an available option for the Japanese 
government the wording of Article 9 has never been changed since the final draft of 
the Peace Constitution was passed in 1946 and took effect in May 1947, only re-
interpreted.88    
In addition to the renunciation of war clause, in my opinion, there are two 
other significant features of the Peace Constitution that should be highlighted in this 
paper, the establishment of popular sovereignty and fundamental human rights.  
Chapter 1, Article 1 establishes that the Emperor is a symbol of the nation who 
derives his position from the will of the people who have sovereign power; and 
Articles 11 – 40 outline all of the basic human rights that bare a close similarity to 
human rights afforded under the American Constitution.89   
The formation of the people’s sovereignty and the fundamental human rights 
encouraged a relationship between the Post-WWII Japanese government and the 
                                                 
86 Kress, Claus. “Renunciation of War as a Universal Principle of Mankind-A Look at the Gulf War 
and the Japanese Constitution.” International and comparative Law Quarterly [Vol. 44], p. 434 
87 Hogg, Chris. “Revising Japan’s ‘ambiguous’ constitution.” BBC (July 9, 2007). 
88 Hogg, Chris. “Revising Japan’s ‘ambiguous’ constitution.” BBC (July 9, 2007).  
89 Bernson, Mary Hammon and Wojtan, Linda S. “Article 9 of the Japanese Constitution.” National 
Clearinghouse for U.S.-Japan Studies.<http://www.indiana.edu/~japan/LP/:s36.html> (19 January 
2004); Google, “Politics and The Constitution,” <http://jinjapan.org/kidsweb/japan/j.html> (19 January 
2004). 
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Japanese people that allowed the opinions of the people to have a more direct impact 
on politicians.  Unlike the Meiji Constitution, where public support rather then public 
opinion was valued, the Peace Constitution was designed where “Japanese public 
opinion may not exert decisive influence on … foreign policy, but the political system 
in Japan assures greater democratic controls.”90  According to the former Ambassador 
to Japan, Edwin Reischauer, “in a democracy… government decisions will on the 
whole mirror public opinion…”91   For Japan, although this principle was written into 
the Peace Constitution surveys show that in the 1960s and 1970s public opinion did 
not support many of the key foreign policies.92  As a result, between 1970s-1990s 
Japanese politicians chose to table the debate regarding a revision of Article 9 or 
reinterpret of Article 9.  For example, in the national survey titled “Opinion on the 
Security Treaty and American bases in Japan,” found in Appendix II on page 71, 45% 
of the 1966 respondents and 61% of the 1968 respondents felt that the American 
Bases were bad for Japan.  However, despite these opinions the foreign policy 
towards the US usage of Japanese territory as bases did not change.  As a result, in 
the national survey, titled “Reflection of Public Opinion in Politics” found in 
Appendix IV-Table 4, in 1971, 1972, and 1973, 54%, 68%, and 72% of the 
respondents, respectively, felt that the government’s policies did not reflect the public 
opinion.   In short, in order to implement both democracy and demilitarize there were 
                                                 
90 Mendel, Douglas H. Jr. “Japanese Opinion on Key Foreign Policy Issues.” Asian Survey, vol. 9, No 
8. (Aug., 1969), p. 625. 
91 Mendel, Douglas H. Jr. “Japanese Opinion on Key Foreign Policy Issues.” Asian Survey, vol. 9, No 
8. (Aug., 1969), p. 625.  
92 Mendel, Douglas H. Jr. “Japanese Opinion on Key Foreign Policy Issues.” Asian Survey, Vol. 9, No. 
8 (Aug., 1969), p. 625-639. 
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concessions that had to be made with regards to both of these two goals.93  The area 
where democracy did succeed for the people was with regards to remilitarization.  
Following the return of former politician, who later made up a number of the leading 
political party – Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) members, the mission to revise the 
constitution to more closely reflect the pre-WWII system was not supported by the 
public opinion.94  With Japan unprotected by its own defense force, Japan had a need 
for implementing a collective security under a security arrangement in Japan. 
Mutual Security Treaty & Self Defense Force  
At the end of WWII, it was a common practice in Japan to put the good of the 
nation before their individual interests.  It was also traditional for the citizens to 
remain uninvolved in national policy decision making.  However, as Japan’s 
economy started to improve and the people realized the Allied occupation was going 
to peaceful, the demands and expectations of the general population, under their 
newly acquired human rights and popular sovereignty, grew.  For example, “the labor 
legislation, between 1945 and 1947, granted rights to organize unions, to bargain 
collectively, and to strike.”95  However, as commercial empires, called zaibatsu, 
redeveloped Japan faced bitter labor disputes.  In order to control public protests and 
                                                 
93 Mendel, Douglas H. Jr. “Japanese Opinion on Key Foreign Policy Issues.” Asian Survey, Vol. 9, No. 
8 (Aug., 1969), p. 625-639 
94 At the same time, both parties [LDP and DPJ] have advocated the revision of Article 9 by adding an 
extra clause explicitly authorizing the use of force for the purpose of self-defense against aggression 
directed against the Japanese nation.”  The Japanese Communist Party (JCP) considers the 
JSDF[Japanese Self Defense Force] unconstitutional and has called for reorganization of Japanese 
defense policy to feature an armed militia.”  “Foreign policy of Japan.” P. 1-7. 
<http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Foreign_policy_of_Japan> (19 April 2006).  
95 Morton, W. Scott & Olenik, J. Kenneth.  “Japan, Its History and Culture.” McGraw Hill, (Fourth 
Edition) 2005, p. 190-230 
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strikes, labor demonstrations had to be suppressed by the US.96  This surprising act 
from a democratic nation was used because of the growing instability in the region 
due to the Cold War and the start of Korean War.97  The United States had to 
maintain stability in Japan in order for Japan to aid the US in its efforts to maintain 
stability in the region.  Therefore, the occupationa l focused shifted by the 1950s from 
demilitarization and democratization to defense and rapid recovery. 98 The United 
Sates began to pressure Japan to assist the US with stopping the spread of 
communism and the defense of Japan.   
The public and government saw the US reverse course and some economic 
policies of the US as cynical and opportunistic.99  Resentment began to grow among 
the Japanese population that further compelled the US to pressure Japan to grow its 
policing measures to include land, air, and sea territories.  However, within the 
government the parties were split regarding Japan’s rights of self-defense by use of 
military forces and its new national policy of pacifism.  Without an agreement from 
the Japanese to rearm for defensive purposes, on September 8, 1951, during the San 
Francisco Peace Conference, the United Sates established a treaty that would address 
Japan’s security dilemma and the US needs – called the Japan-American Treaty of 
Mutual Cooperation and Security (MST), scheduled to be effective on April 28, 
                                                 
96 Morton, W. Scott & Olenik, J. Kenneth.  “Japan, Its History and Culture.” McGraw Hill, (Fourth 
Edition) 2005, p. 190-230.  
97 Morton, W. Scott & Olenik, J. Kenneth.  “Japan, Its History and Culture.” McGraw Hill, (Fourth 
Edition) 2005, p. 190-230. 
98 Morton, W. Scott & Olenik, J. Kenneth.  “Japan, Its History and Culture.” McGraw Hill, (Fourth 
Edition) 2005, p. 190-230. 
99 Morton, W. Scott & Olenik, J. Kenneth.  “Japan, Its History and Culture.” McGraw Hill, (Fourth 
Edition) 2005, p. 190-230.  
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1952.100   On the same day, the United States, Japan, and 46 other nation-states signed 
the San Francisco Peace Conference Treaty, which gave Japan back its sovereignty 
and ended the US-led occupation. 101  
Figure 5: The signing of the U.S.-Japan Security   Figure 6: The signing of the San Francisco 
Treaty (1951)       Peace Treaty (1951) 
      
Bettman/CORBIS/Corbis Japan 102    Bettmann/CORBIS/Corbis Japan 103 
The 1951 security arrangement established provisions for the stationing of 
United States forces in and around Japan for the purposes of the internal and external 
security of the country. 104  In addition to aiding in the defense of Japan, the MST of 
1952 included a military aid program that granted Japan the ability to acquire 
material, acquisition funds, and services necessary for Japan’s defense.105  The 1952 
version of the MST also included the assertion that the MST would be revisited in the 
                                                 
100 “Treaty of Mutual Cooperation and Security between Japan and the United States of America-
January 19, 1960.” < http://133.12.178.4/Faculity/Devine/documents/security60.html >(19 May 2000). 
101 Sakurada, Daizo.  “For Mutual Benefit: The Japan-US Security Treaty: From a Japanese 
Perspective.” Centre for Strategic Studies, (July 1997) 
<http://www.vuw.ac.nz/css/docs/working_papers/WP07.html > (20 February 2003).  
102 Photo from, Embassy of Japan - http://www.us.emb -
japan.go.jp/english/html/japanus/japanusoverview.htm 
103 Photo from, Embassy of Japan - http://www.us.emb -
japan.go.jp/english/html/japanus/japanusoverview.htm 
104 “Treaty of Mutual Cooperation and Security between the United States and Japan.” < 
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/House_of_Representatives_of_Japan > (18 March 2006).  
105 “Treaty of Mutual Cooperation and Security between the United States and Japan.” < 
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/House_of_Representatives_of_Japan > (18 March 2006).  
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near future once a mutually acceptable alternative agreement is adopted.106  For the 
US this security arrangement also permitted “for the US military intervention, at the 
request from Tokyo, in suppressing ‘large-scale internal riots and disturbances in 
Japan caused through instigation or intervention by outside Power or Powers (Article 
I).’”107  Essentially this initial draft of the treaty undermined Japan’s newly acquired 
sovereignty under the San Francisco Peace Conference Treaty by proclaiming that the 
U.S. was permitted intervene in domestic affairs.  In addition, the 1952 treaty did not 
provide the US with much receptacle compensation for the task of securing Japan.   
Essentially, the unfair elements in the 1952 MST were a result of the United 
States’ foreign policy towards the East.  At this time, the United States’ foreign policy 
was not “based on a concern for, or understanding of the peoples and culture of East 
Asia…[But rather] a pragmatic consideration of strategic and economic interests of 
the United States.”  For example, Article 9’s prohibitions initially meet the ally’s 
occupation goals; however once the Cold War and the Korean War began the US was 
forced to reverse course with its policy of disarming Japan.  It took Japan two years 
of debating before they reached a compromise that meat some of the demands of the 
US, which resulted in the creation of the Self-Defense Force (SDF) in 1954.  By 
1956, Japan signed an agreement with Russia to resume diplomatic relations and 
Japan was then admitted into the United Nations.   
                                                 
106 “A Treaty of Mutual Cooperation and Security with Japan: Hearing before the Committee on 
Foreign Relations Untied States Senate-Eighty-sixth congress second session on Ex. E, 86th =congress, 
2D Session, June 7, 1960.” United States Government Printing Office Washington (1960), p. 2-3. 
107 Sakurada, Daizo.  “For Mutual Benefit: The Japan-US Security Treaty: From a Japanese 
Perspective.” Centre for Strategic Studies, (July 1997) 
<http://www.vuw.ac.nz/css/docs/working_papers/WP07.html > (20 February 2003).  
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 However, as the threat of Communism continued to escalate in the East, 
Japan became the United States’ most important ally in the region.  As a result, it 
became imperative that the MST be revised in order to foster a more equal and 
mutually beneficial arrangement that would create an indestructible partnership 
between the US and Japan.108  However, after the revised treaty was passed, on 
January 19, 1960, violent opposition erupted among both politicians and some 
citizens.109  The reason why only some of the citizens were involved in the protests 
was because a large majority of the population was unfamiliar with the provisions of 
the constitution and the security arrangement. According to newspaper and Japanese 
Government surveys on the constitution, at this time about 50% of the general 
population was ignorant of the constitution’s contents, and a similar percentage did 
not know of any of the provisions contained within the revised Security Treaty. 110   
The largest disagreement was focused on how the treaty was passed, not just the 
provisions of the treaty that violated the provisions of Article 9.  Specifically, the 
Japan Socialist Party, one of the leftist political parties,  attempted to prevent the 
LDP, the most powerful political party in Japan at that time, from entering into the 
lower house chambers for voting.111   Once the police ended the boycott the revised 
MST was passed by a default.  The public backlash from this event forced the 
                                                 
108 United States Government Printing Office, Washington.  “A Treaty of Mutual Cooperation and 
Security with Japan: Hearing before the Committee on Foreign Relations United States Senate-Eighty-
Sixth Congress Second Session on Ex. E, 86th =congress, 2D Session, June 7, 1960.” 1960, p. 2. 
109 “Treaty of Mutual Cooperation and Security between the Untied States and Japan.” < 
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/House_of_Representatives_of_Japan > (18 March 2006).   
110 Mendel, Douglas H. Jr. “Japanese Views of Sato’s Foreign Policy: The Credibility Gap.” Asian 
Survey, Vol. 7, No. 7 (Jul., 1967), p. 444-456. 
111 “Treaty of Mutual Cooperation and Security between the Untied States and Japan.” < 
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cancellation of the US President Eisenhower’s scheduled visit to Japan and prompted 
the Japanese Prime Minister Kishi Nobusuke’s resignation. 112   
Despite the opposition to the revised security treaty, the revised treaty was 
much more mutually beneficial then the previous version.  The MST of 1960 outlined 
provisions regarding the further development of international cooperation and future 
economic cooperation.113  Under Article 1 of the MST both the US and Japan are 
instructed to seek peaceful resolutions to international conflict and to work with other 
peace-seeking nations to strengthen the United Nations (UN).114  Articles 2 and 4, of 
the MST, state that both member states must engage in economic and military 
collaborations for the purpose of promoting stability and well-being.115 However, 
Article 3 states that as a result of Japan’s renunciation of war clause they are not 
obligated to provide military aid in the defense of the United States or their 
peacekeeping or peacemaking initiatives.  However, Article 3 stresses that both Japan 
and the United States, “individually and in cooperation with each other, by means of 
continuous and effective self-help and mutual aid will maintain and develop subject 
to their constitutional provisions, their capacities to resist armed attack.”116  And 
                                                 
112 “Treaty of Mutual Cooperation and Security between the Untied States and Japan.” < 
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under Article 10, Japan or the United States were permitted to terminate the MST 
anytime after 1970, which neither state has done. 
Essentially, the MST imposes the United States’ desire that Japan grows its 
Self-Defense Force to improve its defense capabilities and that Japan should support 
UN peacekeeping operations (UNPKO).  In fact, the United States has been 
pressuring Japan since the start of the Korean War to expand its defensive capabilities 
to better support the US efforts to maintain stability in the region.   Because a large 
number of the politicians holding power in the new government were former 
politicians from the pre-WWII government, Article 9 was a safety valve against 
militarism for many of the fractional parties who opposed the revisionist goals of the 
majority party and the US.  Without a consensus in the government or support by the 
public, Japan adapted the interpretation of Article 9 to allow Japan to meet some of 
the American demands.117  The non-decision of the government to revise Article 9 
can be attributed to the traditional method of policy decision making.  The Japanese 
has a traditional culture of making decisions by consensus.  Because the public was 
historically uninvolved with policy decision making, the debates regarding policy 
remained primarily among politicians.  In turn, the task of obtaining a consensus 
among both politicians and now the public was overwhelmingly difficult.  For this 
                                                 
117 “The LDP government has interpreted Article 9 as renouncing the use of warfare in international 
disputes but not in internal use of force for the purpose of maintaining law and order.  The main 
opposition party, the Democratic Party of Japan (DPJ) tends to concur with the government’s 
interpretation.  At the same time, both parties have advocated the revision of Article 9 by adding an 
extra clause explicitly authorizing the use of force for the purpose of self-defense against aggression 
directed against the Japanese nation.”  The oppositional parties “consider the Japanese Self-Defense 
Forces (JSDF) as unconstitutional and advocated the full implementation of Article 9 through the 
demilitarization of Japan…The Japanese Communist Party (JCP) considers the JSDF unconstitutional 
and has called for reorganization of Japanese defense policy to feature an armed militia.” (Wikipedia, 
2007: 3). 
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reason, for the next 20 years after the occupation of Japan, the government tabled the 
subject of revising Article 9.  However, as public discussions began to expand there 
was a corresponding shift in the number of people who favored a possible revision.  
As a result of the changing tide in the culture of public discussion, there has been a 
very aggressive attempt by the Prime Minister and the government to amend Article 9 
and to continue to stretch the interpretation of Article 9 to include participating in 
collective defense.  For example, the below Table illustrates the public opinion trends 
between 2001-2005. (See also, Appendix IV on page 76).  As the table shows, there 
have been aggressive policies undertaken by the government that have been pushing 
Japan closer towards increasing is self-defense capabilities and allowing the defense 
force to participate in collective defensive operations.   
Figure 7:  2001-2005 Public Opinion Trends118 
 
 
                                                 
118 Pekkanen, Robert and Krauss, Ellis S. “Japan’s ‘Coalition of the Willing’ on Security Policies.”  
Elsevier Limited on behalf of Foreign Policy Research Institute (Summer 2005), p. 429-444. 
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For Japan the MST was vital to its security and gave Japan the freedom to 
focus its resources on its economy.  However the MST has also contributed to the 
growing division between the pacifists and pro-revisionist Japanese government and 
public.  As the economy improved, so did the desire to regain its honorable place in 
the world community and possibly become a “normal nation.”  This growing desire 
was also reflected in the public opinion towards Americans, which shifted to a more 
neutral position. (See Appendix IV, Survey of Pro- and Anti- American feelings 
(1960-1975), on page 77.)   However, the public still passionately opposed the 
possibility of remilitarization.119  
 
Current Debate 
  Prior to the Gulf War and the transformation of the prime minister’s role, in 
the 1980s, “most Japanese in the post-World War II period have been unconcerned 
with international crises, and have behaved as if the Korean War, the Taiwan Strait’s 
crisis, the Chinese nuclear weapon program, the Vietnam War and the Indo-Pakistani 
war had nothing to do with Japan’s security.”120  However, at the end of Gulf War I 
and the growing North Korean nuclear threat, Japanese public opinion and the 
government began to show signs of growing closer together. (See Appendix IV-
public opinion trend).   The small improvement in the consensus gap was a result of 
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an electoral reform, a stronger role of the prime minister, and the growing public 
realization that Japan’s foreign policy, constrained by Article 9, is damaging to its 
ability to meet their obligations under the MST and as a UN member.   According to 
Robert Pekanen and Ellis Krauss, author of “Japan’s ‘Coalition of the Willing’ on 
Security Policies,” the electoral reform of 1994 introduced a new, hybrid mixed-
member electoral system similar to some European democracies where voters would 
get two ballots: “one for an individual in the single member district and one for the 
party in the proportional-representation regional constituencies, with the candidates 
elected based on their pre-election party- list ranking.  This provided the strong link to 
constituents afforded by single-member districts and also proportional-representation 
legislators…”121    Under this electoral system, the long standing party leader, LDP, 
who favored a revisionist policy, did not do as well.  In fact for the first time since 
1955, the party lost the majority of seats.   
In addition to electoral reforms, the transformation of the prime minister’s 
influence, over national policies, also had a great impact on the public opinion.  This 
change started with Prime Minister Yasuhiro Nakasone (1982-1987), who used the 
media to gain more influence on policies and elections.122   Essentially, the prime 
ministers during the 80s into the present begun to carve out a role for their position 
that was independent of their party.  As a result, during this transformation, 
“unprecedented defense and security measures, such as extending the Self-Defense 
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Forces’ protection of Japan’s sea lanes and concluding a military technology transfer 
agreement with the United States,” were implemented.123   
Essentially, the prime ministers took a more central role in security and crisis 
policymaking.  Under this transformation of the prime ministers, Japan moved from 
using just “checkbook diplomacy,” where they only supplied financial support to UN 
peace keeping operations (UNPKO), to sending troops abroad to assist logistically in 
peace keeping operation and to assist in national disaster emergencies.  By using the 
media to gain more power and public support for implement ing these defense and 
foreign policy strategies, the public gained more access to policymaking decisions 
and the provisions.  Basically, the prime ministers used “policymaking commissions, 
participation in overseas meetings, and the hosting of foreign guests, for “photo ops” 
opportunities, with the goal that by increasing their visibility they would inadvertently 
increase the power of the prime minister.124   This is the third factor that has 
contributed to the trend towards a revision consensus between the public population 
and the government.  The learning curve for acquiring an increase awareness of 
public policies and provisions specific to Article 9 as well as their impact on Japan’s 
reputation abroad is one of the primary factors that contribute to the public opinion 
perspective that opposed revision of Article 9.   
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Historically, the Japanese people were excluded from national policy making 
and therefore unaware of governmental policies and provisions.  However, as argued 
by Setsu Kobayashi, a constitutional professor at Tokyo’s Keio University, “currently, 
the government discloses information that is beneficial to bureaucrats and hides what 
is not.”125   This lack of information, along with the Japanese history and the memory 
of WWII, has contributed to the public’s pacifist attitude towards Japan’s defense 
policies.126  As a result, Japan’s ability to meet its alliance and national obligations 
are limited.  According to professor Nakamura, without full transparency of 
government information, the government is able to stretch the meaning of Article 9 
even further.127    This method of reinterpretation is acceptable by the people at this 
time, because “despite the realization that Japan’s traditional defense [status] may 
have serious weaknesses, very few people think that Japan should abandon its 
traditional pacifist security [position].  Rather they want to find a way to modify it. 
The goal is to modify the security poster in response to the new reality of the post-
9/11 world without changing the main structure of the policy, according to Professor 
Kamiya.”128   
In addition, the more media coverage that the prime minister had, the more his 
is able to improve the exposure that the public has regarding how interconnected 
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Japan’s security and business interest have become during the new era of anti-
terrorism.  As professor Fukushima stated in the article “changing US-Japan Security 
Relations,” the Japanese “took on a ‘passive pacifist’ role in order not to repeat WWII 
mistakes. But after the Gulf War, Japan realized that it needed to change the nature of 
pacifism from passive to pro-active by showing the world that it has the willingness 
to do what is necessary to protect peace in the international community.129  As a 
result, several provisions were made to greatly strengthen the Japan-American 
relationship under the MST and better prepare Japan for crisis and to improve its role 
in the world.130   
The strategy for implementing these goals includes strengthening and 
redefining the MST.  By improving this relationship, Japan positioned itself into a 
more demanding role with the US and subsequently the United Nations (UN).  
Given’s Japan’s obligations under the MST, during the end of the Cold War, rising 
threats from North Korea, and the onset of anti-terrorism measures, Japan has been 
grossly criticized for its passive pacifist role that it took during various US and UN 
peacekeeping operations.131   For example, “Japan’s failure to do more than provide 
money to aid the coalition’s cause in the Gulf War had subjected [Japan] to scathing 
criticism as practicing only “checkbook diplomacy” while other countries sent their 
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young men to die for Kuwait’s freedom.”132  In short, by improving Japan’s 
relationship with the US under the MST it obligated itself to taking a more active role 
in peacekeeping operations under Article 1.  By not actively participating in 
peacekeeping activities beyond financial and/or logistical support, Japan was forced, 
through international criticism, to realize that the current prohibitions of Article 9 
were undermining its efforts to regain a ‘normal nation’ position in the world 
community.   
It was this national attention that improved the public discussion of security in 
Japan.  Given the criticism of Japan after Persian Gulf War, and subsequent demands 
for Japanese aid beyond fiscal support, the public was no longer reluctant to review 
and debate Japan’s security dilemma.  Essentially, public debates served to improve 
the public’s awareness of the policies and procedures directly related to and impacted 
by Article 9.  Given this phenomenon, as the amount of information that the public 
receives increases there has also been an increase in public support for an Article 9 
revision.  Overall, international and regional crises have made the “Japanese citizens 
aware of the need for and the cost of Japanese peace, security, and safety… In fact, in 
1977… it was argued that such a bill [which would establish laws regarding Japan’s 
response to armed attack] would lead to remilitarization of Japan. [As a result], the 
public was strongly reluctant to even debate or discuss these possibilities and these 
possibilities and these bills.  [However], the North Korean nuclear crisis in 1993 and 
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in 1994 led to their acceptance of a stronger alliance with the United States.133  
According to an opinion poll conducted by Japan’s largest newspaper, Yomiuri 
shinbun, in March 2000, 60% of those polled supported the idea of revising Article 
9.134  The most common reasons given in this survey for this revisionist perspective 
were that they wanted to “enable Japan to actively participate in UNPKO” and the 
“political interpretation and practice of Article 9 caused ambiguity and confusion.”135   
Although a trend demonstrates that a movement towards greater public 
discussion is demonstrated in Appendix 2, given the lack of consensus within 
government regarding this topic and as well as within the public, the wording of 
Article 9 will remain the status quo even while Japan continues to strengthen its 
security arrangement with the US.   However, a change in the public perception 
through an influx of criticism and access to more government information is making 
the possibility of revision more real.     
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Conclusions  
Although Article 9 and the MST have contributed to the peace of Japan, 
Article 9 and the MST have also constrained Japan’s ability to regain “an honorable 
place” in the world community.  Essentially, Article 9 supported by the MST’s 
Article 3, limits Japan’s role in its national defense and international peacekeeping 
operations under the UN.  As a result, the debate that was tabled by politicians during 
the Cold War, if Japan should revise Chapter 2, Article 9 has regained momentum as 
international crisis and threats from North Korea have begun to change the public 
attitude towards Japan’s previous passive pacifist policy. The arguments for revision 
include, “the fact that the constitution was written by Americans and allegedly 
imposed upon the Japanese Government by SCAP,” the fact that Article 9 is 
ambiguous and does not explicitly allow for a Self-Defense Force or include 
provisions for national emergencies, and Japan’s inability under the status quo to 
meet its obligations to UN and MST.   
Given the above debate, it is believed that the only way Article 9 will be 
revised is if there is a consensus between the public and the government regarding the 
changes.  However, this consensus has not been reached.  In fact, there has been a 
sizeable gap between public opinion and national policy. This gap is a result of  
Japan’s historical norms and traditional policy making procedures, the public’s loss of 
trust in the government, and the lack of information regarding polices and provisions 
of the Peace Constitutions and MST.  However, as these three areas have undergone 
significant transformations, there has been a trend towards a change in public opinion 
regarding a possible revision of Article 9.  Despite this progress, there are sizable 
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gaps between proponents for a revision of Article 9 in government and within the 
general population.  In addition, there is not an agreed consensus on specifically what 
would be changed if Article 9 is revised.  As a result, it is less likely that a revision of 
Article 9 will be implemented in the immediate future.  However, given the public 
option trend towards revision of Article 9, it is possible that a revision will be 
implemented in an effort to address the core arguments in this debate.  
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Appendix 
I. Treaty of Mutual Cooperation and Security between Japan and the United States of 
America 136 
ARTICLE I 
The Parties undertake, as set forth in the Charter of the United Nations, to 
settle any international disputes in which they may be involved by peaceful means in 
such a manner that international peace and security and justice are not endangered 
and to refrain in their international relations from the threat or use of force against the 
territorial integrity or political independence of any state, or in any other manner 
inconsistent with the purposes of the United Nations. The Parties will endeavor in 
concert with other peace- loving countries to strengthen the United Nations so that its 
mission of maintaining international peace and security may be discharged more 
effectively. 
 
ARTICLE II 
The Parties will contribute toward the further development of peaceful and 
friendly international relations by strengthening their free institutions, by bringing 
about a better understanding of the principles upon which these institutions are 
founded, and by promoting conditions of stability and well-being. They will seek to 
eliminate conflict in their international economic policies and will encourage 
economic collaboration between them. 
 
ARTICLE III 
The Parties, individually and in cooperation with each other, by means of 
continuous and effective self-help and mutual aid will maintain and develop, subject 
to their constitutional provisions, their capacities to resist armed attack. 
 
ARTICLE IV 
The Parties will consult together from time to time regarding the 
implementation of this Treaty, and, at the request of either Party, whenever the 
security of Japan or international peace and security in the Far East is threatened. 
                                                 
136  
<http://en.wikisource.org/wiki/Treaty_of_Mutual_Cooperation_and_Security_between_Japan_and_the
_United_States_of_America  > (22 March 2006). 
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ARTICLE V 
Each Party recognizes that an armed attack against either Party in the 
territories under the administration of Japan would be dangerous to its own peace and 
safety and declares that it would act to meet the common danger in accordance with 
its constitutional provisions and processes. Any such armed attack and all measures 
taken as a result thereof shall be immediately reported to the Security Council of the 
United Nations in accordance with the provisions of Article 51 of the Charter. Such 
measures shall be terminated when the Security Council has taken the measures 
necessary to restore and maintain international peace and security. 
 
ARTICLE VI 
For the purpose of contributing to the security of Japan and the maintenance 
of international peace and security in the Far East, the United States of America is 
granted the use by its land, air and naval forces of facilities and areas in Japan. The 
use of these facilities and areas as well as the status of United States armed forces in 
Japan shall be governed by a separate agreement, replacing the Administrative 
Agreement under Article III of the Security Treaty between Japan and the United 
States of America, signed at Tokyo on February 28, 1952, as amended, and by such 
other arrangements as may be agreed upon. 
 
ARTICLE VII 
This Treaty does not affect and shall not be interpreted as affecting in any way 
the rights and obligations of the Parties under the Charter of the United Nations or the 
responsibility of the United Nations for the maintenance of international peace and 
security. 
 
ARTICLE VIII 
This Treaty shall be ratified by Japan and the United States of America in 
accordance with their respective constitutional processes and will enter into force on 
the date on which the instruments of ratification thereof have been exchanged by 
them in Tokyo. 
 
ARTICLE IX 
The Security Treaty between Japan and the United States of America signed at 
the city of San Francisco on September 8, 1951 shall expire upon the entering into 
force of this Treaty. 
 
ARTICLE X 
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This Treaty shall remain in force until in the opinion of the Governments of 
Japan and the United States of America there shall have come into force such United 
Nations arrangements as will satisfactorily provide for the maintenance of 
international peace and security in the Japan area. However, after the Treaty has been 
in force for ten years, either Party may give notice to the other Party of its intention to 
terminate the Treaty, in which case the Treaty shall terminate one year after such 
notice has been given. 
In witness whereof the undersigned Plenipotentiaries have signed this Treaty. 
Done in duplicate at Washington in the Japanese and English languages, both equally 
authentic, this 19th day of January, 1960. For Japan: 
Nobusuke Kishi 
Aiichiro Fujiyama 
Mitsujiro Ishii 
Tadashi Adachi 
Koichiro Asakai 
FOR THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA: 
Christian A. Herter 
Douglas MacArthur 2nd 
J. Graham Parsons 
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II.  Public opinion survey of Japanese attitude towards US bases 
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III.  Public Opinion Survey of Reversion of Okinawa and Retention of US Bases 
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IV.  2001-2005 Public Opinion Trend 137 
 
 
                                                 
137 Pekkanen, Robert and Krauss, Ellis S. “Japan’s ‘Coalition of the Willing’ on Security 
Policies.”  Elsevier Limited on behalf of Foreign Policy Research Institute (Summer 2005), p. 429-444. 
Summary of Case Studies 
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V. Public opinion of pro- and anti-American feelings. 138   
 
 
                                                 
138 Kojima, Kazuto. “Public Opinion Trends in Japan.” The Public Opinion Quarterly, Vol. 
41, No.2. (Summer, 1977), pp. 206-216. 
PUBLIC OPINION IN JAPAN 
                                              Pro- and Anti-American Feelings 
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VI.   Survey of public attitude toward national policy decisions.139 
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(Summer, 1977), pp. 206-216. 
The Leave-Everything-to-the -Politicians Attitude  
Relative Merits of the Japanese and Westerners  
Reflection of Public Opinion in Politics 
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No Political Party Allegiance (by Age) 
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VII. Change in nationalism, democratic tendencies and precedence of private life 
 
Preferred Way of Living  
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VIII:  Survey-“What would be the way to ensure Japan’s security?” (1969-2003)140 
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